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 
Abstract— Searchable Encryption is an emerging 
cryptographic technique that enables searching capabilities over 
the encrypted data on the cloud. In this paper, a novel searchable 
encryption scheme for the client-server architecture has been 
presented. The scheme exploits the properties of modular inverse 
to generate a probabilistic trapdoor which facilitates the searching 
over the secure inverted index table. We propose 
indistinguishability that is achieved by using the property of a 
probabilistic trapdoor. We design and implement a proof of 
concept prototype and test our scheme onto a real dataset of files. 
We analyze the performance of our scheme against our claim of 
the scheme being light weight. The security analysis yields that our 
scheme assures higher level of security as compared to other 
schemes. 
Index Terms— Searchable Encryption, Modular Inverse, 
Extended Euclidean Algorithm, Indistinguishability, Privacy 
Preservation, Inverted Index, Database as a Service (DaaS). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
LOUD is an environment that provides the utility of on 
demand resource sharing and data access to the clients and 
their devices remotely. Apart from the core categories of cloud 
services i.e. SaaS, PaaS, IaaS, nowadays, Database as a Service 
(DaaS) enables people to store their files on the cloud. This 
DaaS helps in achieving availability of the documents but there 
are some interrelated concerns associated to DaaS that are 
security, trust, expectations, regulations and performance issues 
[1]. The concerns above are interdependent and should be 
addressed simultaneously. Encryption is probably the best 
solution that comes to one’s mind while talking about security. 
However, in the context of DaaS, searching over the encrypted 
text or Searchable Encryption (SE) is a difficult and resource 
consuming task. 
This requires a SE scheme to be developed that would 
facilitate performing textual searches over encrypted data. Such 
a scheme would help maintain privacy of the outsourced 
documents while enabling the search over the encrypted 
documents. There are three main challenges associated with SE 
as discussed in [2] i.e. (1) efficiency, (2) security and (3) query 
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expressiveness. These three terms can be assumed to be the 
vertices of a triangle and an idealistic SE scheme should be 
developed in such a way that it transforms the triangle into an 
equilateral triangle. In other words, a balance needs to be 
maintained between the faced challenges while designing a SE 
scheme. 
National Security Agency (NSA) has highlighted the 
concerns related to security in the cloud and has proposed the 
use of homomorphic encryption [3]. Homomorphic encryption 
enables to perform operations on encrypted data. Though 
homomorphic encryption has revolutionized the field of 
cryptography, there are still major concerns related to 
performance. In [4] the authors have conducted a survey and 
comparison of different homomorphic and non-homomorphic 
SE schemes. Their result yields that non-homomorphic SE 
schemes out-perform homomorphic SE schemes in terms of 
efficiency. 
Till now the use of SE has been explored in connection with 
E-mail servers [5] to conduct searches on confidential emails. 
In the healthcare domain [6][7] the SE has been researched as 
an effective method of providing keyword search on patients 
health records. SE could have a profound impact on areas 
related to telecom, e-commerce, warfare, big data analysis, 
cloud storage. 
In this paper we present a novel lightweight ranked SE 
scheme. We develop and implement a proof of concept 
prototype and test it on a database containing 2000 documents. 
By developing the prototype, we explore the deployment of our 
scheme in the telecom industry. We use the Switchboard-1 
speech database [8] that is a corpus of spontaneous 
conversations which addresses the growing need for large 
multi-speaker databases of telephone bandwidth speech. The 
corpus contains 2430 conversations averaging 6 minutes in 
length; in other words, over 240 hours of recorded speech, and 
about 3 million words of text, spoken by over 500 speakers of 
both genders from every major dialect of American English. 
This database consists of 120,000 distinct keywords. Based on 
the results we generate graphs and show that the scheme is 
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lightweight and shows a linear growth while scaling the input. 
Hence, we prove that our scheme can perform efficient 
keyword search on telephone speech. Furthermore, our scheme 
can be equally helpful for performing SE in the aforementioned 
domains. 
Most of the schemes[5][9][10][11] proposed till date are 
proven secure in the random oracle model (ROM)[12]. ROM is 
based on the basic assumption that the cryptographic primitives 
are replaced with idealized versions. In [13] authors have 
presented a twenty year retrospective on the ROM. The authors 
discuss the controversies associated with the use of ROM. This 
evidence us to prove the security of our scheme in the standard 
model that only limits the adversary by the resources available 
i.e. time and computational resources. 
A. Our Contributions 
Following contributions to the field of SE have been made in 
this work: 
 Our foremost contribution is that we enumerate the 
properties of a “secure” ranked SE scheme by formally 
defining keyword-trapdoor indistinguishability and 
trapdoor-index table indistinguishability. 
 A primary contribution in this research is that we define 
“complete indistinguishability” in searchable 
encryption. 
 We design and present a novel Ranked based Searchable 
Encryption scheme that is completely based on a 
probabilistic encryption algorithm to address the 
distinguishability attacks. 
 We design and implement a proof of concept prototype 
and test our scheme onto a real dataset of files containing 
120,000 keywords and 2000 documents to analyze the 
performance of our scheme. 
B. Organization 
Section II presents the literature review in which existing SE 
schemes are discussed. Section III discusses Ranked Searchable 
Encryption Scheme (RSE) model by formally defining our 
construction. In Section IV, we revisit the security definitions 
related to searchable encryption and propose new definitions 
for our proposed ranked searchable encryption scheme. Finally, 
in Section V, we present our ranked searchable encryption 
scheme followed by a security analysis. In Section VI, we 
perform a comparative analysis of the existing scheme against 
our scheme in terms of complexity. We also develop a proof of 
concept prototype and test our scheme onto a live dataset of 
documents by analyzing the computational time. The 
computational time is also analyzed in Section VI. The 
conclusions along with the future work are drawn towards the 
end of the paper, in Section VII. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A state of the art searchable encryption scheme must maintain 
a balance between security and efficiency. Previous researches 
fail to maintain this balance thus resulting in a system that lacks 
adaptability. In this section we discuss some significant 
schemes. 
 
Wang et al. in [14][15] for the first time introduce the 
concept of ranked keyword searching over encrypted data. The 
authors have proposed two schemes for single keyword search 
over encrypted text. Their scheme was an extension of [16] and 
they added secure ranking to it. Both the schemes facilitate the 
server to perform ranked keyword searching on user’s behalf. 
In both the schemes, the user will generate the same trapdoor 
while searching for a particular file. Therefore, the schemes 
lack in providing indistinguishability. There is an advantage of 
their later scheme as it helps in providing dynamic inverted 
index i.e. whenever a new file is added to the server the re-
ranking is not to be done but this comes with a huge 
computation cost which will be discussed in the section VI. 
Furthermore, the later scheme helps to keep the ranking score 
encrypted that will help to avoid leakage of occurrence of a 
particular keyword to the server. However, in [17] the authors 
have launched a successful differential attack on the 
aforementioned scheme. The authors have demonstrated that 
the scheme still leaks the relevance scores to the adversary from 
which the encrypted keywords can be inferred by using 
estimated distributions. Therefore, their scheme lacks in 
providing resistance against distinguishability attacks and leaks 
information. 
Kamara et al. in [10] have proposed a dynamic searchable 
symmetric encryption scheme. Their work can be termed as an 
extension of their previous scheme that they had proposed in 
[16]. Their scheme facilitates the adding, deletion or 
modification of a document. The change is brought to the server 
at run time and comes with minimal modification and 
recompilation of the inverted index. For the deletion of the file 
they use an additional data structure that contains the pointers 
to the file being deleted. For the modification they use 
homomorphic encryption to encrypt the pointer so that based on 
the homomorphic encryption properties the server can get 
modify the file. Though this can be termed as a breakthrough in 
the field of searchable encryption, there is a drawback of their 
scheme i.e. the generated trapdoor is deterministic and the same 
trapdoor is generated for the same word every time hence it 
cannot resist distinguishability attacks. Furthermore, they have 
also analyzed that their scheme leaks even more information as 
compared to the previous scheme hence this scheme cannot be 
termed as an ultimate solution. 
Wang et al. in [18] have proposed a range search scheme on 
encrypted spatial data. Their scheme i.e. Geometric Range 
Searchable Encryption (GRSE) supports searchable symmetric 
encryption by mapping the datasets to a set of points lying 
within a geometric shape. Their design is indeed remarkable as 
it is not dependent upon a particular geometric shape and 
supports Axis-parallel Rectangles, Circles, Non-axis-parallel 
Rectangles and triangles. However, in this scheme all the data 
records within a dataset will be returned as the result and the 
user may have to download every file containing that particular 
keyword hence it will result in extra network traffic. 
Furthermore, with the increase in the outsource data, the size of 
the bloom filter is meant to be increased that will result in the 
slowing down of the searching. They have also proposed an 
extension of their probabilistic GRSE by using trees to increase 
the efficiency of searching. However, as we have mentioned 
earlier, this searching comes with a tradeoff of privacy as the 
tree may reveal the path pattern. So this scheme does not 
provide the desired level of security and privacy and reveals too 
much information. 
Tang in [19] has proposed a symmetric searchable multiparty 
encryption scheme (MPSE) that is an extension of [20]. In their 
scheme they introduce a Follow algorithm that allocates a token 
to the writer to be distributed among the readers (user) of the 
index table. This token authorizes the reader to perform the 
search on the index table. This scheme facilitates the dynamic 
users but does not allow dynamic databases. The authors 
assume that there is a secure channel between the user and cloud 
server to transmit the trapdoors. Although, the secure channel 
hides the leakage of the trapdoor during transmission, the 
trapdoor is based on one-way hash function due to which the 
server itself can learn the access pattern and the keyword being 
searched for since the same trapdoor is generated for the same 
keyword. In other words the trapdoor is distinguishable. Their 
scheme uses forward index i.e. an index for each file due to 
which the ranking cannot be done. 
In [21] Li et al. for the first time proposed efficient fuzzy 
keyword searching on encrypted cloud data. The authors have 
proposed two schemes i.e. the basic scheme and the wildcard 
based scheme. Their proposed work tolerates the searching over 
a dataset consisting of slight typo mistakes or errors. They use 
the edit distance to measure the distance between the similar 
erroneous words. The authors claim that the wildcard based 
scheme is efficient and effective though they have not 
performed any performance or complexity analysis of their 
scheme. We perform the analysis in Section VI and show the 
complexity of their scheme. Furthermore, since they are using 
deterministic encryption for the generation of the trapdoor 
hence the scheme is unable to provide prevention against 
deterministic attacks and hence reveals the outcome of the 
search and access pattern. 
III. RANKED SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION MODEL 
We consider a single writer/single reader (S/S) architecture 
and use the client-server infrastructure by visualizing a scenario 
in which there are two parties, Alice (Client) and a Cloud Server 
(CS). Alice intends to upload all her documents D=
{𝐷1, 𝐷2, … , 𝐷𝑁} to the CS to enable remote access. CS performs 
the searching of relevant documents on behalf of Alice. In the 
scheme it is assumed that the CS is a trusted but curious server. 
Being trusted means that CS acts in a known and designated 
manner but CS is also willing and curious to get hold of full or 
partial information about the documents uploaded and held with 
it. 
Alice identifies a set of keywords W= {𝑊1,𝑊2, … ,𝑊𝑖} 
from the set of documents D and generates a relevance score 
based on the frequency of occurrence of the words with the set 
of documents D. These relevance scores help in performing 
ranked searching. Ranked searching facilitates the search by 
giving user the liberty to select the most relevant documents 
from a collection by identifying the frequency of occurrence of 
a keyword within a set of documents. Ranked searching is 
mainly used for single keyword search because the server may 
find several documents satisfying the query whereas, in 
complex queries, the server might be able to identify just a few 
number of documents in response to the search query. 
Therefore, ranked searching is not effective in multi-keyword 
or expressive queries. 
In [22], a formula (equation 1) has been presented that is 
commonly used for the relevance frequency generation and is 
widely used by researchers for designing the rank based 
searchable encryption schemes. For example in [15][14] 
authors have used the equation 1 for the ranking in searchable 
encryption  
 𝑅𝐹(𝑊,𝐷) = ∑
1
|𝐷|
∙ (1 + ln 𝑓𝐷,𝑊) ∙ ln (1 +
𝑁
𝑓𝑊
)𝑡∈𝑊      (1) 
where 𝑊 denotes the keyword to be searched; 𝐷 denotes the 
document; |𝐷| denotes length of the document obtained by 
counting the words appeared in the document 𝐷; 𝑓𝐷,𝑊 denotes 
number of times a word 𝑊 appears within a particular 
document 𝐷; 𝑓𝑊 denotes the number of documents in the 
dataset that contain the word 𝑊 and 𝑁 denotes the total number 
of documents in the dataset. 
Now Alice generates an index table 𝐼 (see Section V for more 
details). Now Alice outsources the index table 𝐼 along with the 
encrypted documents D to the CS. 
If Alice wants to search for a document containing a specific 
keyword, she simply generates a trapdoor T and sends it to CS. 
CS uses the trapdoor T to search the index table 𝐼 and returns a 
set of relevant documents in a ranked order. Figure 1 shows the 
flow of events of the RSE scheme where a client is interacting 
with a CS. It can be seen that mainly all the tasks are performed 
on the client’s side, whereas, the searching is done at the CS 
side. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  The flow of events of proposed RSE scheme. 
We now formally define our proposed Ranked Searchable 
Encryption scheme (RSE) that facilitates the search over 
encrypted documents in ranked order. The following definition 
presents the algorithms and the phases that our scheme 
comprises of. 
 
Definition (Ranked Searchable Encryption Scheme (RSE)) A 
RSE comprises of five polynomial time algorithms Π =
(KeyGen, Build_Index, Build_Trap, Search_Outcome, Dec) 
such that: 
(𝐾, 𝑘𝑠) ← KeyGen(1
𝜆): is a probabilistic key generation 
algorithm run by the client. The algorithm takes a security 
parameter λ as the input and returns a master key K and 
a session key 𝑘𝑠. 
(𝐼) ← Build_Index(𝐾, 𝐷): is a deterministic algorithm run by 
the client to generate an index table 𝐼. The algorithm takes 
a master key K and a collection of documents D to be 
outsourced to the CS as input. The algorithm returns a 
secure index 𝐼. 
𝑇𝑤 ← Build_Trap(𝐾,𝑘𝑠, 𝑤,num): is a probabilistic algorithm 
run by the client. The algorithm requires the master key 
𝐾, a session key 𝑘𝑠 , keyword w and the number (num) of 
documents D required as the input. The algorithm returns 
a trapdoor 𝑇𝑤. 
𝑋 ← Search_Outcome(𝑘𝑠, 𝐼, 𝑇𝑤): is a deterministic algorithm 
run by the CS. The algorithm takes the session key 𝑘𝑠 , 
index table 𝐼 and the trapdoor (𝑇𝑤) as the input and 
returns X, a set of desired document identifiers encrypted 
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑖𝑑(𝐷𝑖)) containing the keyword w in ranked order. 
𝐷𝑖 ← Dec(𝐾, 𝑋): is a deterministic algorithm run by the client. 
The algorithm takes client’s master key and encrypted set 
of document identifiers 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑖𝑑(𝐷𝑖)) to decrypt and 
recover the document id’s. 
Correctness: A RSE scheme is correct if for the security 
parameter λ, the master key 𝐾 and the session key 𝑘𝑠 generated 
by KeyGen(1𝜆), for (𝐼) output by Build_Index(𝐾, 𝐷), the 
search using the trapdoor 𝑇𝑤 always returns the correct set of 
encrypted document identifiers 𝐸𝐾(𝑖𝑑(𝐷𝑖)) in ranked order. 
A RSE scheme is correct if the following are true: 
 
 If 𝑤 ∈ 𝐷𝑖  then the following should hold with an 
overwhelming probability 
𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒(𝑘𝑠, 𝐼, 𝑇𝑤) = 𝐷 ∩ 𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝐾, 𝑋) 
       =  𝐷𝑖 , where 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 
 
 If 𝑤 ∉ 𝐷𝑖  then the following should hold with an 
overwhelming probability 
𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ_𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒(𝑘𝑠, 𝐼, 𝑇𝑤) = 𝐷 ∩ 𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝐾, 𝑋) = 0 
 
Soundness: A RSE scheme is sound if for the security 
parameter λ, the master key 𝐾 and the session key 𝑘𝑠 generated 
by KeyGen(1𝜆), for (𝐼) output by Build_Index(𝐾, 𝐷), the 
search using the trapdoor 𝑇𝑤 always returns sound results i.e. the 
result should not contain any false positives. 
A RSE scheme is sound if the following are true: 
 
 If 𝑤 ∈ 𝐷𝑖  then the following should hold with an 
overwhelming probability  
Search_Outcome(𝑘𝑠, 𝐼, 𝑇𝑤)=1 
 
 If 𝑤 ∉ 𝐷𝑖  then the following should hold with an 
overwhelming probability 
Search_Outcome(𝑘𝑠, 𝐼, 𝑇𝑤)=0 
IV. SECURITY DEFINITIONS FOR RANKED SEARCHABLE 
ENCRYPTION (RSE) 
In the context of searchable encryption, security is studied 
about privacy preservation of the data outsourced to the 
CS[23][24]. 
A. Existing Security Definitions 
The problem of searching over encrypted data has received 
attention for more than a decade now. Back in 2000, Song et al. 
in [25] were the first to come up with a practical way of 
searching symmetrically over encrypted data. Till then there 
was no formal definition regarding security for SE. Since 2000 
several definitions and constructions of SE have been 
presented. In 2003, Goh [26] for the first time came up with the 
security definitions of searchable encryption called Semantic 
Security Against Adaptive Chosen Keyword Attack (IND-
CKA). In the same paper, he proposed a searchable encryption 
scheme that met his proposed definition. There were some 
assumptions related to the definitions i.e. the number of 
keywords (size of the documents) with in the document should 
be same in order to achieve indistinguishability and if the index 
is indistinguishable the trapdoors need not to be kept secure. 
Since their definitions were focused towards secure indices and 
not probabilistic trapdoors, their definitions could not be 
generalized. 
In [24] authors came up with an extension of IND-CKA that 
aimed to counter the assumption of same size documents. They 
supported their definition by presenting a secure index 
construction called z-index which was based on bloom filters. 
As highlighted in [16] that the definition was not secure and 
would be fulfilled by any insecure searchable encryption 
scheme. Later Goh introduced extended definitions IND1/2-
CKA and now the documents did not need to be of the same 
size, and the trapdoor was again not kept secure. Curtmola et 
al. in [16][23] claimed that all the previous definitions did not 
provide adequate security and proposed two new definitions 
Adaptive/Non-Adaptive Indistinguishability Security for SSE. 
Both of the newly proposed definitions have their weaknesses 
and don’t provide adequate level of indistinguishability. We 
discuss the limitation of their slightly stronger definition i.e. 
Adaptive Indistinguishability below. 
B. Limitations of previous definitions 
As mentioned earlier, Curtmola’s definitions are widely 
accepted and used. They introduce four terms in [23] incurred 
as a result of a search query i.e. History, Access Pattern, Search 
Pattern and Trace. The history defines a tuple containing the 
document collection and the keywords. Access patterns 
represents the outcome, i.e. the documents contain a particular 
keyword. The Search pattern tells if the same keyword is being 
searched every time. Their security definition is defined as 
nothing is leaked beyond the access pattern and the search 
pattern while the Trapdoor is deterministic. Their definition of 
Indistinguishability refers to the indistinguishable index table 
generated based on pseudo-random functions. 
We remark that Curtmola’s work clearly provides the desired 
level of security when the trapdoor is deterministic but their 
SSE-2 lacks in maintaining privacy associated to the trapdoor 
and hence it is prone to distinguishability attacks. Their 
construction (SSE-2) generates the same trapdoor 
(deterministic) every time the same keyword is queried. As a 
result the search pattern discloses which trapdoors correspond 
to the same underlying keywords resulting in privacy concerns 
(cf Section 4.2 of [23]). The deterministic trapdoor reveals the 
corresponding history tuple “prior” to the search. Furthermore, 
if an adversary is accidently given access to the trapdoor oracle 
then all the future searches are revealed. Hence, we term their 
definitions a primary “Baseline” for any SE scheme but 
improved definitions are required for enhancing the security 
and highlighting the advantage of a probabilistic trapdoor under 
those improved definitions. 
Therefore, based on the improved security definitions a 
secure construction is required that primarily provides 
indistinguishable index table and ensures trapdoor 
indistinguishability that results in the increase in the security 
and privacy of the entire system. 
Now, we can formally state the privacy concerns associated 
to RSE that are based on the following points 
 The index table contains information crucial for searching 
over the encrypted text and helps to relate keywords to the 
documents. The index table should not reveal any (partial) 
information about the documents (encrypted or 
unencrypted) or the keywords (encrypted or unencrypted) 
that form the table. 
 The trapdoor should not reveal any information about the 
keyword (unencrypted) that is being queried and should 
maintain privacy of search. 
 The trapdoor should be probabilistic and should not 
disclose the corresponding underlying encrypted 
keywords or document identifiers “prior” to the search. 
 The outcome of the trapdoor should not uncover any 
information about the encrypted document that is returned 
as a result of the query to the user. 
C. Security Definitions for Proposed RSE 
We now revisit the existing definitions of SE that will be 
utilized to prove the security of our proposed scheme. We 
propose new definitions for indistinguishability and define 
complete indistinguishability in the terms of ranked searchable 
encryption. An ideal searchable encryption scheme should 
fulfill all these definitions to ensure privacy. In Section V(G), 
we prove that our scheme complies with the following 
definitions. 
 
1) Definition 1 (𝐷1): Non-Adaptive Indistinguishability for 
Searchable Encryption 
 
Non-Adaptive means that the adversary 𝒜 cannot make queries 
based on the outcome of the previous query [16][23]. Therefore, 
searchable scheme preserves security in the sense of non-
adaptive indistinguishability if for any two non-adaptively 
constructed histories (documents & keywords) with equal 
length and trace (documents length, search pattern and 
outcome) no adversary can distinguish between the view 
(encrypted documents, trapdoors & Index) of one history from 
the view of the other in polynomial time with non-negligible 
probability over 1 2⁄ . 
 
 
 
2) Definition 2 (𝐷2): Adaptive Indistinguishability for 
Searchable Encryption 
 
Adaptive means that the adversary 𝐴 can make queries based 
on the outcome of the previous query [16][23]. Therefore, 
searchable scheme preserves security in the sense of adaptive 
indistinguishability if for any two adaptively constructed 
histories (documents & keywords) with equal length and trace 
(documents length, search pattern and outcome) no adversary 
can distinguish between the view (encrypted documents, 
trapdoors & Index) of one history from the view of the other in 
polynomial time with non-negligible probability over 1 2⁄ . 
 
3) Keyword-Trapdoor Indistinguishability for Ranked 
Searchable Encryption Scheme 
 
Keyword-Trapdoor Indistinguishability refers to the act of 
performing a search over encrypted text in such a way that the 
redundancy in the statistics of the (plain text) keywords should 
be dissipated into the associated trapdoor. Therefore, for the 
same keyword appearing twice the trapdoor should not be able 
to distinguishable even if the history (keyword, trapdoor) is 
generated adaptively. To guess the word or the document’s 
content the attacker has to intercept a tremendous amount of 
data to uncover the underlying plain text in polynomial time. 
The challenger begins by generating an index table against a 
data collection D. The adversary selects a keyword 𝑤 and sends 
it to the challenger. The challenger generates a trapdoor and 
sends it back to the adversary. This continues until the 
adversary has submitted polynomial-many keywords. Now the 
challenger tosses a fair coin 𝑏, the adversary has to submit two 
keywords (𝑤0, 𝑤1) to the challenger and receives a trapdoor 
corresponding to the keyword 𝑤𝑏 . The adversary has to guess 
and output the bit 𝑏. 
 
Definition 3 (D3)(Keyword-Trapdoor Indistinguishability). Let 
RSE=(KeyGen, Build_Index, Build_Trap, Search_Outcome, 
Dec) be a Ranked Searchable Encryption scheme over a 
dictionary W, λ be the security parameter, D be the set of 
documents and 𝒜 = (𝒜0, 𝒜1, … ,𝒜𝑁+1) be such that 𝑁 ∈ ℕ 
and consider the following probabilistic experiment 
𝐊𝐞𝐲_𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐩RSE,𝒜(𝜆): 
 
𝐊𝐞𝐲_𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐩RSE,𝓐(𝜆) 
(𝐾, 𝑘𝑠) ← KeyGen(1
𝜆) 
(𝐼) ← Build_Index(𝐾, 𝐷) 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 
(𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 𝑤𝑖) ← 𝒜𝑖(𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 𝑇𝑤2 , … , 𝑇𝑤𝑖−1) 
𝑇𝑤𝑖 ← Build_Trap𝐾(𝑤𝑖) 
𝑇𝑤𝑁 ← Build_Trap(𝐾, 𝑘𝑠, 𝑤𝑁 , 𝑛𝑢𝑚 ) 
𝑏
$
← {0,1} 
(𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 𝑤0, 𝑤1) ← 𝒜0(1
𝜆) 
𝑇𝑤𝑏 ← Build_Trap(𝐾, 𝑘𝑠, 𝑤𝑏 , num) 
𝑏′ ← 𝒜𝑁+1(𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 𝑇𝑤𝑏) 
𝑖𝑓 𝑏′ = 𝑏, 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 1 
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 0 
where 𝑠𝑡𝒜  is a string that represents and captures 𝒜′𝑠 state. We 
say that the keyword-trapdoor indistinguishability holds if for 
all polynomial-size adversaries (𝒜0, 𝒜1, … ,𝒜𝑁+1) such that 
𝑁 = poly(𝜆), 
 
Pr [𝐊𝐞𝐲_𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐩RSE,𝒜(𝜆) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ negl(λ), 
Where probability is over the choice of 𝑏. 
We explain this by designing a game in the standard model. 
 
Game 1: Let RSE be a Searchable Encryption scheme (𝑆𝐸). 
Suppose that there are at most 𝑁 keywords W =
(𝑊1,𝑊2, … ,𝑊𝑁) and 𝑀 documents D = (𝐷1, 𝐷2, … , 𝐷𝑀), 
where 𝑁,𝑀 ∈ ℕ (set of natural numbers) associated to an index 
table. The game is played between an adversary 𝒜 and a 
challenger 𝒞. The game is divided into three phases as follows: 
 
Phase 1: The adversary 𝒜 sends a keyword to the challenger 
𝒞. The challenger 𝒞 returns a trapdoor to 𝒜. This continues 
between the adversary 𝒜 and the challenger 𝒞 for a while. 
 
Challenge Phase: The adversary 𝒜 selects two keywords 
𝑊1
′,𝑊2
′ ∈ 𝑊 and send them to the challenger 𝒞. The selection 
of the keywords can be done as follows: 
a) 𝒜 intends to search for unique keywords such that 
𝑊1
′ ≠ 𝑊2
′; 
The challenger 𝒞 in response tosses a fair coin 𝑏 ← {0,1} and 
generates two trapdoors corresponding to the values of b i.e. 
𝑇
𝑊𝑏
′
′  such that 𝑇𝑊1′
′ ≠ 𝑇𝑊2′
′ . 
After the challenge has been completed, Phase 1 is run again. 
We allow the adversary to search for the same keywords again 
if interested. 
 
Outcome Phase: 𝒜 is given the generated Trapdoors 
𝑇𝑊1′
′ , 𝑇𝑊2′
′ . 𝒜 will now have to guess and output 𝑏′ ∈ {0,1} and 
if 𝑏 = 𝑏′ then the adversary wins. In other words the adversary 
𝒜 has to output trapdoor T corresponding to 𝑊1
′,𝑊2
′ to the 
challenger 𝒞 in polynomial time. If the adversary 𝒜 correctly 
guessed the trapdoor corresponding to the word then it has won 
otherwise RSE provides keyword-trapdoor indistinguishability 
and the challenger 𝒞 wins. 
Therefore the probability that the adversary 𝒜 wins is 
1
2
 
which is according to the definition stated above. 
 
4) Trapdoor-Index Indistinguishability for Ranked Searchable 
Encryption 
Trapdoor-Index indistinguishability relates to the complexity 
offered by a Searchable Encryption (𝑆𝐸) scheme. The 
keyword, trapdoor and index table should be complex and 
involved in such a way that trapdoor should not reveal the 
corresponding index table entries prior to the search and should 
not be distinguishable. Therefore, for the same keyword 
appearing twice the trapdoor should not be able to 
distinguishable even if the history (keyword, trapdoor, index) is 
generated adaptively. Furthermore, change of one bit/character 
of the keyword should completely change the Trapdoor and 
Index Table or vice versa. 
The challenger begins by generating index table against a 
data collection D. The challenger sends the set of keywords 𝑊, 
the trapdoors generated for all the keywords 𝑊 along with the 
associated index table entries 𝐼[0][𝑊] to the adversary while 
maintaining the order in which they occur. Now the challenger 
tosses a fair coin 𝑏, the adversary has to submit two keywords 
(𝑤0, 𝑤1) to the challenger and receives a trapdoor 
corresponding to the keyword 𝑤𝑏 . The adversary is now to 
decide the corresponding index value and is challenged to 
output the bit 𝑏. 
Definition 4 (D4)(Trapdoor-Index Indistinguishability). Let 
RSE=(KeyGen, Build_Index, Build_Trap, Search_Outcome, 
Dec) be a Ranked Searchable Encryption scheme over a 
dictionary W, λ be the security parameter, D be the set of 
documents and 𝒜 = (𝒜0, 𝒜1) be such that 𝑁 ∈ ℕ and 
consider the following probabilistic experiment 
𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐩_𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐱RSE,𝒜(𝜆): 
 
                        𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐩_𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐱RSE,𝓐(𝜆) 
(𝐾, 𝑘𝑠) ← KeyGen(1
𝜆) 
(𝐼) ← Build_Index(𝐾, 𝐷) 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁 
𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝐼′ = 𝐼[0][𝑖] 
𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑤 = (𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑖) 
𝑇𝑤𝑖 ← Build_Trap(𝐾, 𝑘𝑠, 𝑤𝑖 , num) 
𝑏
$
← {0,1} 
(𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 𝑤0, 𝑤1) ← 𝒜0(𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 1
𝜆, 𝑤𝑁 , 𝐼
′, 𝑇𝑤𝑁) 
𝑇𝑤𝑏 ← Build_Trap(𝐾, 𝑘𝑠, 𝑤𝑏 , num) 
𝑏′ ← 𝒜1(𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 𝐼𝑤𝑏) 
𝑖𝑓 𝑏′ = 𝑏, 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 1 
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 0 
 
where 𝑠𝑡𝒜  is a string that represents and captures 𝒜′𝑠 state. We 
say that the trapdoor-index indistinguishability holds if for all 
polynomial-size adversaries (𝒜0, 𝒜1, … ,𝒜𝑁+1) such that 𝑁 =
poly(𝜆), 
Pr [𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐩_𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐱RSE,𝒜(𝜆) = 1] ≤
1
2
+ negl(λ), 
Where probability is over the choice of 𝑏. We explain this by 
designing a game in the standard model. 
 
Game 2: Let RSE be a Searchable Encryption (𝑆𝐸) scheme. 
Suppose that there are at most 𝑁 keywords W =
(𝑊1,𝑊2, … ,𝑊𝑁) and 𝑀 documents D = (𝐷1, 𝐷2, … , 𝐷𝑀), 
where 𝑁,𝑀 ∈ ℕ (set of natural numbers) associated to an index 
table. The game is played between an adversary 𝒜 and a 
Challenger 𝒞. The game is divided into three phases as follows: 
 
Phase 1: The challenger 𝒞 generates an index table 𝐼 
corresponding to the set of documents. The challenger 𝒞 
generates and sends the trapdoors for all keywords W , the index 
table entries corresponding to the trapdoor and the keywords to 
the adversary 𝒜. 
 
Challenge Phase: The adversary 𝒜 is allowed to select two 
keywords 𝑊1
′,𝑊2
′ ∈ 𝑊 and send them to the challenger 𝒞. The 
selection of the keywords can be done as follows: 
a) 𝒜 intends to search for unique keywords such that 
𝑊1
′ ≠ 𝑊2
′; 
The challenger 𝒞 in response tosses a fair coin 𝑏 ← {0,1} and 
generates two trapdoors corresponding to the values of b i.e. 
𝑇
𝑊𝑏
′
′  such that 𝑇𝑊1′
′ ≠ 𝑇𝑊2′
′ . 
After the challenge has been completed, the adversary 𝒜 is 
given access to the previously generated history that was sent 
in Phase 1. 
 
Outcome Phase: 𝒜 is given the generated Trapdoors 
𝑇𝑊1′
′ , 𝑇𝑊2′
′ . Adversary 𝒜 will now have to guess and return the 
index entry corresponding to the Trapdoors 𝑇𝑊1′
′ , 𝑇𝑊2′
′  and 
𝑊1
′,𝑊2
′ in polynomial time. The adversary 𝒜 wins if the guess 
is correct otherwise RSE provides trapdoor-index table 
indistinguishability, and the challenger 𝒞 wins. 
Therefore the probability that the adversary 𝒜 wins is 
1
2
 
which is according to the definition stated above. 
 
Theorem 1: Keyword-Trapdoor Indistinguishability and 
Trapdoor-Index table results in the Complete 
Indistinguishability for a Ranked Searchable Encryption 
Scheme 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑓 Let RSE=(KeyGen, Build_Index, Build_Trap, 
Search_Outcome, Dec) be a Ranked Searchable Encryption 
scheme. We make the following claim that leads to the proof of 
this theorem. 
 
𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑚: If RSE is Keyword-Trapdoor Indistinguishable, then it 
is Trapdoor-Index Indistinguishable 
 
Firstly, we assume that there exists a polynomial-size adversary 
𝒜 that succeeds in an experiment 𝐊𝐞𝐲_𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐩RSE,𝒜(𝜆) with 
non-negligible probability over 1 2⁄ , then there exists a 
polynomial size adversary ℬ and a polynomial size 
distinguisher 𝒟 that distinguishes between the output of the 
experiment 𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐩_𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐱RSE,𝒜(𝜆) with non-negligible 
probability over 1 2⁄ . 
Let adversary ℬ sample 𝑏
$
← {0,1}; computes (𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 𝑤0, 𝑤1) ←
𝒜0(1
𝜆). The adversary ℬ. The distinguisher 𝒟 is given access 
to a history consisting of trapdoors and corresponding keywords. 
The adversary proceeds as follows: 
 
1. It parses (𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 𝑤𝑖) ← 𝒜𝑖(𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 𝑇𝑤2 , … , 𝑇𝑤𝑖−1) where 
2 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑁; 𝑁 ∈ ℕ 
2. It computes 𝑏′ ← 𝒜𝑖+1(𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 𝑇𝑤𝑏) 
3. It outputs 1 if  𝑏′ = 𝑏 , and 0 otherwise. 
 
Clearly, ℬ and 𝒟 are polynomial size adversary since 𝒜𝑖+1 
are. Now, we have to guess the probability of 𝒟’s success. 𝒟 
will output 1 if and only if 𝒜𝑖+1(𝑠𝑡𝒜 , 𝑇𝑤𝑏) succeeds in 
correctly guessing 𝑏. It is to be noted that the Build_Trap phase 
is dependent upon trusted atomic primitives and uses a 
probabilistic encryption algorithm therefore the outcome is 
independent of 𝑏. Therefore, 𝒜𝑖+1 will guess 𝑏 with the 
probability atmost 1 2⁄  which is according to the definitions 
D3. Therefore, our initial assumption of such an adversary who 
can succeed in the experiment 𝐊𝐞𝐲_𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐩RSE,𝒜(𝜆) with a non-
negligible probability over 1 2⁄  is wrong. Hence the 
distinguisher 𝒟 that distinguishes between the output of the 
experiment 𝐓𝐫𝐚𝐩_𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐱RSE,𝒜(𝜆) with non-negligible 
probability over 1 2⁄  does not exist and it is according to our 
definition D4. Hence our claim (stated above) is correct. 
Now, we prove that an RSE is “Completely Indistinguishable”. 
As discussed earlier, the entire scheme is dependent upon a 
probabilistic trapdoor and provides Keyword-Trapdoor and 
Trapdoor-Index indistinguishability. According to definition 
D4, since a probabilistic trapdoor maps to an index location 
while maintaining privacy, the privacy of the corresponding 
document identifiers is also preserved. Due to the probabilistic 
trapdoor, the indistinguishability and privacy between the 
entities involved in the RSE is maintained on the whole that 
results in complete indistinguishability. 
V. PROPOSED RANKED SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION (RSE) 
FRAMEWORK 
As discussed in Section III, our RSE scheme comprises of five 
main phases. We now, present and discuss each of these phases 
below. (Table I shows the notations and abbreviation used in 
our scheme). 
TABLE I 
NOTATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
𝐶𝑆 – Represents a Cloud Server 
𝐷 − Denotes a set of all possible documents to be outsourced to the 
cloud. That is 𝐷 = {𝐷1, 𝐷2, … , 𝐷𝑁}. 
𝑊 − Denotes a set of unique Keywords extracted from 𝐷𝑁 such that 
𝑊 = {𝑊1,𝑊2, … ,𝑊𝑖} 
|𝑊| − Denotes total number of identified distinct keywords. 
|𝐷| − Denotes the size of a particular document, obtained by 
counting the words appeared in the document 𝐷. 
𝑅𝐹 − Denotes the relevance frequencies of the keywords 𝑊 among 
the documents 𝐷. 
𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑘(𝑅𝐹) – Denotes the masked 𝑅𝐹 
𝑃 − Denotes a prime number of the size 𝜆 (security parameter) +1. 
𝑖𝑑(𝐷𝑖) − Denotes the set of unique identifiers for each 𝐷𝑖. 
𝐼 − Denotes the secure inverted Index table stored on CS and 
provides ranked keyword searching. 
𝑇𝑊𝑖  − Represents the unique trapdoors generated to identify 
documents 𝐷 containing word 𝑊𝑖. 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟 – Represents the conversion of a value from 
Hexadecimal to positive Integer. 
𝐸𝑛𝑐 − Denotes a probabilistic encryption algorithm such as AES. 
𝐷𝑒𝑐 − Denotes the decryption algorithm corresponding to 𝐸𝑛𝑐. 
𝑥 ← 𝐴 − Represents that 𝑥 contains the content of the variable 𝐴. 
𝐻(. ) – Represents a keyed one-way hash function. 
𝐾 – Represents the master key 
𝑘𝑠 – Represents the session key 
A. KeyGen Phase 
The KeyGen algorithm helps the client to generate the keys. 
The algorithm takes input a security parameter λ The client 
generates a master key 𝐾; where, 𝐾𝜖{0,1}𝜆 and a session key 
𝑘𝑠; where, 𝑘𝑠𝜖{0,1}
𝜆. The master key 𝐾 is kept secret with the 
client whereas the session key 𝑘𝑠 is shared with the server prior 
to the Build_Index phase. 
 
 
 
Phase 1: KeyGen 
 
a) Input: A security parameter λ. 
b) Output: Master key 𝐾 and session key 𝑘𝑠 
B. Build_Index Phase 
The client generates an index table 𝐼 represented by a 
dynamic array 𝐴. The client uses a cryptographic Hash function 
𝐻: {0,1}𝜆 ×𝑊 → {0,1}𝐿 
where 𝐿 is the length of the output. The keyed Hash function 
𝐻 uses the master key 𝐾 to generate hash of the keywords and 
convert them to positive integer. The array 𝐴 holds three 
attributes. The first row of the array consists of a value that is 
generated by calculating the inverse of the hash of a keyword 
after converting it into positive integer. The first column 
consists of the encrypted document identifiers 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑖𝑑(𝐷𝑁)) 
of all the outsourced documents. Whereas, the remaining 
entries of the array are the relevance frequencies of the 
keywords 𝑊 among the documents 𝐷. The relevance 
frequencies are calculated according to equation (1). Each 
column represents the relevance frequencies associated to a 
particular keyword 𝑊. We multiply each column (excluding the 
first row and first column of the array 𝐴) with a random number, 
represented by 𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑘(𝑅𝐹). This way the relevance frequencies 
are masked while maintaining proportion between the relevance 
scores of the keyword 𝑊 occurring in different documents. This 
helps to prevent frequency analysis attack and disclosure of 
document size while maintaining correct ranking of documents. 
 
 
Phase 2: Build_Index 
 
 
a) Input: A set of documents 𝐷 and a master key 𝐾, a 
Hash functions 𝐻(. ). 
b) Initialization: 
 Initialize dynamic 2D Array 𝐴. 
 Scan 𝐷 and build 𝑊, a set of unique and distinct 
keywords occurring in 𝐷. 
 Initialize Prime number 𝑃 of the size 𝜆 + 1bits. 
c) Build Index 𝐼: 
 for 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ |𝑊𝑖|: 
− let 𝑎 ← 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐻𝐾(𝑊𝑖)) mod P 
− Compute 𝑎−1 and store it in 𝐴[1][𝑡]; 
− Compute 𝐸𝐾(𝑖𝑑(𝐷𝑁)),store it in 𝐴[𝑡][1]; 
− Calculate the 𝑅𝐹 for each 𝑊𝑖 occurring in 
𝐷𝑁 using equation (1) and store the value 
at the respective locations within 𝐴; 
 𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑘(𝑅𝐹): 
for 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑛𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐴  
− for 1 ≤ 𝑛 ≤ 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐴 
o 𝐴[𝑛 + 1][𝑚 + 1] = 𝐴[𝑛 + 1][𝑚 +
1] ∗ 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠 
d) Output: Index table 𝐼 
C. Build_Trap Phase 
The client generates a trapdoor to search for documents 
containing a particular keyword. The client using the master 
key 𝐾 generates the hash H(.) of the keyword and converts it 
into positive integer under mod 𝑃, represented by 𝑎. Again with 
a probabilistic symmetric encryption algorithm, encrypts the 
keyword and converts the result into positive integer under mod 
P, represented by 𝑏. Now c is computed by multiplying 𝑎 with 
𝑏 under mod P. The client uses a cryptographic keyed Hash 
function 
𝐻: {0,1}𝜆 ×𝑊 → {0,1}𝐿 
 
where 𝐿 is the length of the output. The keyed Hash function 
𝐻 uses the master key 𝐾 to generate 𝑎, the hash of the keyword 
and uses session key 𝑘𝑠 to generate 𝑑, the 𝐻𝑘𝑠(𝑏). The trapdoor 
consists of 𝑑, 𝑐 and the desired number of documents 
represented by 𝑛𝑢𝑚.  
The trapdoor is transmitted to the CS. 
 
 
Phase 3: Build_Trap 
 
 
a) Input: The master key (𝐾), the session key (𝑘𝑠), a 
keyword (𝑤𝑖), a Hash functions 𝐻(. ), desired 
number of documents (𝑛𝑢𝑚). 
b) Trapdoor Generation: 
 let  𝑎 ← 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐻𝐾(𝑊𝑖)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃 
 let  𝑏 ← 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑊𝑖)) mod P. 
 let   𝑐 ← 𝑎 ∗ 𝑏 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃 
 let  𝑑 ← 𝐻𝑘𝑠(𝑏). 
 Set Trapdoor 𝑇𝑊𝑖 ← (𝑑, 𝑐, 𝑛𝑢𝑚). 
c) Output: Transmit 𝑇𝑊𝑖 to CS. 
D. Search_Outcome Phase 
CS now undertakes the search based on the received 
trapdoor. The server has 𝑑, 𝑐 and 𝑛𝑢𝑚. The CS tries to find an 
entry for which the following condition holds true 𝑑 ==
𝐻𝑘𝑠(𝑐 ∗ 𝑎
−1𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃). On a positive hit, the CS returns client the 
encrypted document identifiers in ranked order based on the 
documents having the highest relevant frequencies. The total 
number of documents returned will be equal to 𝑛𝑢𝑚. 
 
 
Phase 4: Search_Outcome  
 
a) Input: A trapdoor 𝑇𝑊𝑖 transmitted by the client, a 
session key 𝑘𝑠, a Hash functions 𝐻(. ) (same as 
Build_trap phase) and the index table 𝐼. 
b) Initialization:  
 Dynamic Array 𝑋. 
c) Searching: 
 for 1 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐼: 
− if (𝑑 == 𝐻𝑘𝑠(𝑐 ∗ 𝑎
−1𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃)):  
o for 1 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛𝑢𝑚:  
 find highest RF, return 
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑖𝑑(𝐷𝑖)); 
−  𝑋[ ] ← 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑖𝑑(𝐷𝑖)); 
d) Output: X; //set of encrypted document identifiers 
stored in ranked order. 
E. Dec Phase 
The client after receiving the ranked encrypted document 
identifiers, decrypts them to uncover the document identifiers 
containing the searched keyword. 
 
 
Phase 5: Dec  
 
a) Input: The master key (𝐾), A set 𝑋 of encrypted 
document identifiers stored in ranked order 
b) Decryption: 
 for 1 ≤ 𝑜 ≤ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑋: 
− 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝐾(𝑋[𝑜]); 
c) Output: Documents identifiers 𝑖𝑑(𝐷𝑖) 
 
Remark 1: The index table 𝐼 needs to be regenerated whenever 
the database is modified but this can be avoided if we remove 
ranking because the re-ranking is to be done whenever a 
modification is made to the outsourced database. 
 
Remark 2: By multiplying the relevance score with random 
numbers, we mask the actual frequency of the keywords and 
avoid the frequency analysis attack while performing effective 
and efficient ranked searching. This also helps to prevent the 
disclosure of the size of the documents and maintaining 
privacy. 
F. Analysis of the proposed RSE scheme 
We now prove that our proposed RSE scheme provides 
correctness and soundness (defined in Section III).  
 
Let (𝐾, 𝑘𝑠) represent the output of the KeyGen phase, 
where, the master key 𝐾𝜖{0,1}𝜆 and the session key 
𝑘𝑠𝜖{0,1}
𝜆. Given 𝑤,𝑤′ ∈ 𝑊, it is straight forward to verify 
that the following are true: 
 Given 𝑇𝑤 = Build_Trap(𝐾, 𝑘𝑠, 𝑤, 𝑛𝑢𝑚), the following 
equality holds with a probability 1 
 
𝑇𝑤 =
{
 
 
 
 𝐻𝑘𝑠 (
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑤)) ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐻𝐾(𝑤)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃
) ,
(
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑤)) ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐻𝐾(𝑤)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃
) ,
𝑛𝑢𝑚 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Given 𝑇𝑤 = Build_Trap(𝐾, 𝑘𝑠, 𝑤, 𝑛𝑢𝑚), and 𝑤
′ ≠ 𝑤, the 
following inequality holds with an overwhelming 
probability: 
 
𝑇𝑤 ≠
{
 
 
 
 𝐻𝑘𝑠 (
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑤
′)) ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐻𝐾(𝑤
′)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃
) ,
(
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑤
′)) ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐻𝐾(𝑤
′)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃
) ,
𝑛𝑢𝑚 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
In fact, this inequality can hold only if 𝐻𝐾(𝑤) = 𝐻𝐾(𝑤
′) 
which is having a negligible probability. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that a unique trapdoor is mapped 
to a distinct keyword. Since the index table contains encrypted 
file identifiers 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑖𝑑(𝐷)) for every document that maps to 
the keywords, therefore, as a result, the value of 
Search_Outcome phase corresponds to the value outlined in the 
correctness and soundness definitions mentioned in Section III. 
Therefore, the proposed RSE scheme is correct and sound. 
G. Security Analysis 
All of the previously known searchable encryption 
constructions leak some information because they were based 
on deterministic trapdoor [10][9]. In [27] authors have studied 
the access pattern disclosure of the previously known 
searchable encryption schemes that were based on deterministic 
trapdoors. Our proposed scheme is based on a probabilistic 
trapdoor. So before mapping our scheme against the security 
definitions stated in Section IV, we would like to formally 
highlight any information that our scheme leaks. We analyze 
any possible leakage of information significant or insignificant, 
encrypted or unencrypted based on a set of assumptions. We 
analyze all the artifact that are obtained from the five 
polynomial time algorithms explained previously i.e. index 
table 𝐼, trapdoor 𝑇𝑤 and the outcome of a search. While defining 
the leakage we assume that the attack is launched by an 
adversary 𝒜 in a standard model so we do not restrict the 
adversary by replacing our scheme with any weak construction. 
The leakage focuses on the information that is revealed within 
polynomial time. Our security analysis yields the following 
results: 
 
 
1) Leakage 𝐿1 
Description: The leakage 𝐿1 is associated to the index 
table 𝐼 
Assumption: We assume that 𝐼 is revealed to all the 
stakeholders i.e. the client, Cloud Server and the 
adversary 𝒜. 
Definition: The Leakage 𝐿1 is defined as: 
 
𝐿1(𝐼) =
{
 
 
 
 (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐻𝐾(𝑊𝑖)))
−1
,
𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑖𝑑(𝐷𝑖)),
𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑘(𝑅𝐹),
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑜_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝐻𝐾(𝑊𝑖)) }
 
 
 
 
 
 
2) Leakage 𝐿2 
Description: The leakage 𝐿2 is associated to the 
Trapdoor 𝑇𝑤 generated for a particular keyword 𝑤 to be 
searched. 
Assumption: We assume that 𝑇𝑤 is generated by the 
client and revealed to all the stakeholders i.e. Cloud 
Server and the adversary 𝒜. 
Definition: The Leakage 𝐿2 is defined as: 
 
𝐿2(𝑇𝑤) = {
𝑎 ← 𝐻𝐾(𝑊𝑖) ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑊𝑖) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃,
𝑏 ← 𝐻𝑘𝑠(𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑊𝑖))𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑃,
𝑛𝑢𝑚
} 
 
3) Leakage 𝐿3 
Description: The leakage 𝐿3 is associated to search 
outcome (SO) of the Trapdoor generated for a particular 
word (𝑇𝑤) 
Assumption: The search outcome is revealed to all the 
stakeholders i.e. i.e. the client, Cloud Server and the 
adversary 𝒜. 
Definition: The Leakage 𝐿3 is defined as: 
 
𝐿3(SO) = {OC(𝑤), 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝐾(𝑖𝑑(𝐷𝑖))∀𝑇𝑤∈𝐷𝑖
} 
 
where OC is the outcome 
 
As the trapdoor is based on a probabilistic encryption algorithm 
and a keyed hash function therefore we can say that that leakage 
associated to trapdoor is meaningless and we do not need to 
worry about it. do not leak any information. Therefore, it is 
evident that 𝐿1 and 𝐿2 lead to the security and privacy concern 
but we will prove that these leakage do not reveal any 
information about the data outsourced. Another point to be 
noted here is that these leakages and assumptions are 
interrelated and interdependent hence to maintain security all 
the assumptions should be strictly met. 
 
Lemma 1. The Ranked Searchable Encryption Scheme (RSE) 
presented above is “secure” as it is (𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3)-secure and 
according to Definition 𝐷1, 𝐷2, 𝐷3, 𝐷4, where 𝐿1 is associated 
with the index table 𝐼 and leaks the encrypted file identifiers, 
masked relevance frequencies, inverse of hash of keyword. 
Whereas, 𝐿2 leaks a,b and the number of required documents 
and 𝐿3 leaks the outcome of a trapdoor and the encrypted file 
identifiers. 
Proof Sketch. The security of our proposed scheme is 
dependent upon trusted atomic primitives therefore we claim 
that our scheme adds to the security of these primitives and does 
not weaken the security provided by the atomic primitives. We 
refer to the algorithm explained in Figure 3. The 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛 phase 
generates two keys (𝐾, 𝑘𝑠) ← 𝐾𝑒𝑦𝐺𝑒𝑛(𝜆). The 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝 phase 
generates an index table (𝐼) ← 𝑆𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑝(𝐾, 𝐷𝑁) corresponding to 
the set of documents. The Build_Trap(K,𝑘𝑠,w,num) generates a 
trapdoor 𝑇𝑤 corresponding to the word 𝑤 to be searched and 
Search_Outcome(𝑘𝑠, 𝐼, 𝑇𝑤) represents the outcome of the 
trapdoor. In order to prove that our scheme satisfies this lemma 
we first prove that our scheme satisfies the security definitions 
𝐷1, 𝐷2, 𝐷3, 𝐷4. Since our scheme uses indeterminisitic / 
probabilistic encryption for the trapdoor generation therefore 
the generated trapdoor 𝑇 is also indeterministic and unique for 
the same keyword searched twice. It is hard for an adversary to 
map the trapdoor to the keyword or form a relationship between 
the keyword, trapdoor and index table prior to the search. This 
also holds true for an adversary maintaining a history of the 
search and outcome. Hence it satisfies the security definitions 
of 𝐷1, 𝐷2, 𝐷3, 𝐷4. 
Now we need to prove the security of our scheme against the 
leakage 𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3. We argue that the leakage 𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3 are 
meaningless and do not affect our scheme. It can be seen that 
the three leakages are either encrypted, masked or Hashed 
values. Based on the assumption of the master key (𝐾) being 
secret, the Hash cannot be regenerated by an adversary. 
Furthermore, we use a probabilistic encryption algorithm for 
the encryption due to which the no meaningful information can 
be obtained in polynomial time. 
Therefore our scheme is (𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3)-secure against 
adaptive/non-adaptive indistinguishability attacks and provides 
Keyword-Trapdoor Indistinguishability & Trapdoor-Index 
table indistinguishability. 
 
Lemma 2. The Ranked Searchable Encryption Scheme (RSE) 
presented above is “Completely Indistinguishable” as it is 
(𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3)-secure and according to Definition 𝐷1, 𝐷2, 𝐷3, 𝐷4, 
where 𝐿1 is associated with the index table 𝐼 and leaks the 
encrypted file identifiers, masked relevance frequencies, 
inverse of hash of keyword. Whereas, 𝐿2 leaks a,b and the 
number of required documents and 𝐿3 leaks the outcome of a 
trapdoor and the encrypted file identifiers. 
 
 Proof Sketch. We extend the proof of Lemma 1 to establish 
proof of this lemma. We have already proved that our scheme 
is (𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐿3)-secure since the trapdoor of the proposed scheme 
is generated based on probabilistic encryption therefore our 
scheme satisfies the definitions 𝐷3, 𝐷4. Since the trapdoor T is 
indistinguishable over the keyword W and the index table 𝐼, 
therefore there is an equal probability that the generated 
trapdoor T may be generated for any keyword 𝑊𝑖 and may be 
mapped to any index table 𝐼 entry. Therefore, the outcome 
(prior to the search) will be completely indistinguishable. 
Hence the proposed RSE scheme is completely 
indistinguishable. 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Algorithmic Analysis 
The algorithmic analysis is based on the complexity analysis 
of the target schemes. We analyze the algorithm of each scheme 
and perform this complexity analysis. This analysis is based on 
upper bound analysis of the set of keywords (𝑊) and set of 
document (𝐷). In the asymptotic analysis the complexities of 
set of keywords (𝑊) is denoted by 𝑚, whereas the complexity 
of the set of document (𝐷) is denoted by 𝑛. As discussed 
previously, each scheme mainly comprises of 4 phases i.e. 
KeyGen, Build_Index, Build_Trap Search_Outcome and Dec 
phase. KeyGen and Dec phase are fairly identical to that other 
schemes. This is why we skip the comparative analysis of these 
phases and move onto the Build_Index phase. We extend the 
analysis of the remaining phases of all the schemes. We perform 
the analysis of our scheme while considering ranking and no-
ranking. This way the readers can easily relate and evaluate the 
efficiency of our scheme to other schemes under discussion. 
 
 
 
 
The algorithmic analysis is based on two cases: 
1) 𝑛 < 𝑚 
In this case we assume that the number of keywords will 
be greater than the number of documents. From the 
complexity analysis of our scheme, it is evident that the 
Build_Index phase requires 𝛩(𝑛2) where 𝑛 is the total 
number of documents in the dataset. The Build_Trap phase is 
bound by 𝛩(𝑚), where 𝑚 are the total number of words in the 
dataset. The Search_Outcome phase is bound by 𝛩(𝑚𝑛). We 
would like to highlight that if we remove the ranking 
functionality from our scheme then the efficiency of the 
Build_Index Phase increases to 𝛩(𝑛). Whereas, the efficiency 
of Search_Outcome phase can be increased to 𝛩(𝑛 + 1). 
Table 2 shows the algorithmic comparative analysis of the 
schemes when 𝑛 > 𝑚. From the table it is evident that our 
scheme is efficient as compared to the other schemes. 
 
 
 
Scheme 
Complexity 
Build_Index 
Phase 
Build_Trap 
Phase 
Search_Outcome 
Phase 
ERSE[14] 𝛩(𝑛2 + 3𝑛) 𝛩(2𝑚) 𝛩(𝑚𝑛) 
DSE[10] 𝛩(𝑛2 + 4𝑛) 𝛩(𝑚 + 3) 𝛩(3𝑛) 
GRSE[18] 𝛩(𝑛2 + 𝑛) 𝛩(𝑚) 𝛩(𝑚𝑛) 
MPSE[19] 𝛩(𝑛2 + 𝑛) 𝛩(𝑚) 𝛩(𝑚𝑛) 
FSE[21] 𝛩(𝑛2) 𝛩(𝑚) 𝛩(𝑚𝑛) 
Our work 𝛩(𝑛2) 𝛩(𝑛) 𝛩(3) 𝛩(𝑚𝑛) 𝛩(𝑛 + 1) 
TABLE II 
ALGORITHMIC ANALYSIS 
 
 
2) 𝑛 = 𝑚 
In this case, we assume that the number of keywords are 
equal to the number of documents. Since 𝛩(𝑛2) is the upper 
bound of 𝛩(𝑚𝑛), therefore, 𝛩(𝑚𝑛) can be represented as 
𝛩(𝑛2). We graphically represent the complexities of the 
schemes by analyzing their phases separately. Our work is 
represented by (I) and (II), where (I) is for ranked searching 
and (II) is for unranked searching. We do the complexity 
analysis of our scheme by comparing it with the ranked and 
unranked schemes separately. 
Figure 3 shows the Build_Index phase of the ranked 
schemes. It can be seen that the complexity of our proposed 
RSE scheme and existing ranked scheme increases with the 
increase in the number of documents. Even though our 
protocol also shows an exponential growth, it is more efficient 
and outperforms the other existing scheme. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Complexity analysis of Build_Index phase in ranked schemes. 
 
On considering our scheme without ranking, it exhibits a 
mentionable linear growth as compared to existing schemes that 
show an exponential growth. Figure 4, graphically represents 
the complexity of the unranked schemes. From the graph it is 
evident that with the increase in the number of documents, there 
is a very slight increase in the complexity. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Complexity analysis of Build_Index phase in unranked schemes. 
The complexity of the Build_Trap phase isn’t effected by 
ranking or un-ranking. Therefore, Figure 5 represents a 
collective graph of the Build_Trap phase of ranked and 
unranked schemes. It can be seen that all the schemes show a 
linear growth but our proposed scheme outperforms other 
schemes in terms of complexity by maintaining the same 
efficiency even with the increase in the number of keywords 
being searched. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  Complexity analysis of Build_Trap phase. 
 
Figure 6 illustrates a graph generated for the 
Search_Outcome phase of the RSE schemes. It can be seen that 
our proposed scheme and the existing ranked scheme are 
showing an exponential growth by depicting the same 
complexity. 
Whereas, when we compare our unranked scheme with the 
similar existing unranked schemes then our scheme performs 
much better and is faster. Our unranked scheme shows a linear 
growth in terms of the complexity. Figure 7 shows a complexity 
analysis of the Search_Outcome phase of the unranked 
schemes.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Complexity analysis of Search_Outcome phase in ranked schemes. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Complexity analysis of Search_Outcome phase in unranked schemes. 
 
The overall complexity analysis of our scheme against 
existing schemes yields that our scheme dominates the existing 
schemes in terms of efficiency and can be termed a lightweight 
scheme. 
B. Computational Analysis 
a) Dataset Description 
The Switchboard-1 Telephone Speech Corpus 
(LDC97S62)[28] was originally collected by Texas Instruments 
in 1990-1, under DARPA sponsorship. The first release of the 
corpus was published by NIST and distributed by the LDC in 
1992-3. The Switchboard-1 speech database [8] is a corpus of 
spontaneous conversations which addresses the growing need 
for large multi-speaker databases of telephone bandwidth 
speech. The corpus contains 2430 conversations averaging 6 
minutes in length; in other words, over 240 hours of recorded 
speech, and about 3 million words of text, spoken by over 500 
speakers of both genders from every major dialect of American 
English. The dataset comprises of 120,000 distinct keywords. 
A time-aligned word for word transcription accompanies each 
recording. As such it constitutes a realistic dataset of telephone 
speech, and for this reason the Switchboard-1 transcriptions 
were used to illustrate the functionality of the searchable 
encryption presented in this paper. 
b) Implementation Details 
To demonstrate the feasibility of our RSE scheme, we have 
implemented our algorithms in Java and present the results in 
the form of graphs using MATLAB2016. The implementation 
helps us analyze the time that each phase of the algorithm takes 
while gradually scaling the input (documents or keywords). In 
order to highlight the cost of cryptography we have 
implemented the testbed such that the client and server side 
implementation is done on the same machine. Hence, the 
analysis does not take the cost incurred while transferring the 
documents, index tables or trapdoor over the network, to the 
CS, in to account. 
The implementation uses all the algorithms presented in 
Section V. We achieve encryption by implementing 128-bit 
AES-CBC and the keyed cryptographic hash function used is 
SHA-128. The dataset used is of the size 59MB and it contains 
2100 files in total. The workstation used for the demonstration 
runs with an Intel Core i5 CPU running at 3.00GHz and 8GB of 
RAM. 
c) Performance Metrics 
To determine the performance of our RSE scheme, we 
analyze the performance of each individual phases that have 
been discussed throughout the paper. Since KeyGen and Dec 
phase are fairly identical to that of other schemes we therefore 
skip the performance analysis of these phases and shift our 
focus on to the remaining phases starting from the Build_Index 
phase. 
 
1) Build_Index Phase 
 
The Build_Index Phase comprises of index generation. After 
the index table is generated it is transmitted to the CS. We 
analyze the computation time index table generation. The 
computational cost analysis is done by running the code on a 
total of 120,000 distinct keywords, identified and extracted 
from a dataset of 2100 files. 
The index table is generated by the client and transmitted to 
the server. Our sheme facilitates both ranked and un-ranked 
searches depending upon the required functionality and area of 
application. As we have mentioned in Section V, our scheme 
uses equation 1 for the relevance score generation to achieve 
ranking. This ranking comes with an increase in the number of 
computations resulting in an increase in computational time. 
Therefore, we execute ranked index generation and un-ranked 
index generation seperately. 
 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Computational time for Index Generation (Ranked). 
 
Figure 9 shows a graphical representation for the running 
time of the Index generation (ranked) in seconds (sec). We 
execute this phase for a total of 2000 documents, starting from 
100 documents and gradually scaling the number of documents 
to 2000. For 2000 documents the Index generation takes a total 
of 14.7 seconds and shows a linear growth. 
Figure 10 shows the computational time for the Index 
Generation while removing ranking. It is evident that the 
computational time is enormously reduced and 2000 documents 
require only 4.9 seconds while maintaining a linear growth with 
the increase in the number of documents. 
 
 
Fig. 10.  Computational time for Index Generation (Un-Ranked). 
 
2) Build_Trap Phase 
 
As discussed earlier, the trapdoor acts as a search query and 
is generated by the client for a particular keyword. The 
generated trapdoor is transmitted to the server and it facilitates 
the search of the relevant documents. The trapdoor generation 
is not effected by the ranked or unranked searching so the 
Computational time remains the same. The Build_Trap phase is 
executed for the keyword “about” and the trapdoor generation 
takes a constant time of mere 0.016 seconds. 
 
3) Search_Outcome Phase 
 
Once the encrypted documents along with the index table are 
uploaded on to the CS and the trapdoor has been generated and 
transmitted to the CS, the next step is the searching of relevant 
documents. Figure 11, represents the graph generated on 
executing the Search_Outcome phase against the trapdoor 
generated for the keyword “about”. The searching takes a total 
of mere 0.050 seconds against 2000 documents and shows a 
linear growth. The outcome of the search is ranked. The label 
on the nodes represent the number of documents that are 
returned against the trapdoor, containing the searched keyword. 
For example, out of the total 2000 documents in the dataset, 
1943 documents contain the keyword “about”. 
 
 
 
Fig. 11.  Computational time for searching for the keyword “about”. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we have readdressed the problem of supporting 
keyword search on encrypted data outsourced to the cloud. We 
make several contributions to this domain by presenting a novel 
ranked based searchable encryption scheme. Our construction 
exploits the properties of modulo prime to generate a 
probabilistic trapdoor. The greatest challenge in searchable 
encryption is to maintain a balance between security, efficiency 
and query expressiveness.  
In order to perform the security analysis of our scheme, we 
revisit the existing definitions for searchable encryption and 
introduce the concept of indistinguishability. We prove the 
security of our scheme by giving formal proofs to the new 
definitions and designing games in the standard model. From 
the security analysis of our construction it is realized that the 
scheme provides greater security under these proposed 
definitions as compared to previous schemes. In order to prove 
the efficiency of our scheme, we perform an asymptotic 
analysis of existing schemes against our scheme. The results 
yield that our scheme is lightweight and outperforms existing 
schemes. 
We design and implement a proof of concept prototype and 
successfully test our scheme onto a real dataset of files. The 
analysis of the result yields that our scheme shows a linear 
growth with the increase in the input. Based on the results we 
can term our scheme to be extremely lightweight. 
In our future work, we will extend our proposed scheme to 
support multi-keyword searching to further support query 
expressiveness and deploy it to a multi-client architecture. 
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